We propose an asynchronous distributed average consensus algorithm that guarantees information-theoretic privacy of honest agents' inputs against colluding passive adversarial agents, as long as the set of colluding passive adversarial agents is not a vertex cut in the underlying communication network. This implies that a network with (t + 1)-connectivity guarantees information-theoretic privacy of honest agents' inputs against any t colluding agents. The proposed protocol is formed by composing a distributed privacy mechanism we provide with any (non-private) distributed average consensus algorithm. The agent' inputs are bounded integers, where the bounds are apriori known to all the agents.
Introduction
Algorithms for distributed average consensus allow agents in a peer-to-peer network to compute the average of all the agents' inputs [16, 22, 28] . Some well-known applications of distributed average consensus include sensor fusion in multi-sensor networks [21, 23] , distributed computation of support vector machines [8] , and solving economic-dispatch problems in smart grids [29] . Distributed average consensus can also be used in peer-to-peer networks for voting or monitoring. Typical distributed average consensus algorithms require agents to share their inputs with their neighbors [1, 3, 4, 16, 22, 26, 28] . This infringes agents' privacy, which is undesirable as certain agents in the network might not be trustworthy.
In this paper, we show how to construct distributed average consensus protocols, if the inputs of the agents are integers, that ensure privacy of honest agents' inputs in the presence of passive adversarial agents (also known as semi-honest agents [2] ) in the network. Passive adversarial agents are assumed to follow the prescribed protocol, but may try to use the information learned during execution of the protocol to infer something about the inputs of other agents. Our notion of privacy is adopted from the field of information-theoretic secure multi-party computation (MPC) [2, 11] : it ensures that colluding adversarial agents learn nothing, in an information-theoretic sense, about the collective inputs of the honest agents beyond learning the average value of the honest agents' inputs. The latter is unavoidable, as it can be deduced from the global average whose computation is the purpose of running the consensus algorithm.
While privacy can often be achieved by relying on generic completeness theorems for (information-theoretic) secure multi-party computation [2, 6, 11] , those results do not immediately apply to our setting because they assume a complete network with a dedicated communication channel between each pair of agents. In contrast, we are interested in algorithms that can be used regardless of the underlying network topology. There are few results in that setting. Garay et al. [9] studied secure computation in incomplete networks, and showed that arbitrary functions can be computed with information-theoretic privacy against t colluding semi-honest agents so long as the communication network is (t + 1)-connected. However, their work relies on protocols for secure message transmission [7] that emulate pairwise channels between every pair of agents over an incomplete network. In addition to incurring a significant cost in terms of round-and message-complexity, relying on secure message transmission also requires the agents to have complete knowledge of the network topology. The protocol we propose here adds minimal cost to existing distributed average consensus protocols, and only requires agents to be aware of their neighbors. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that our results also require (t + 1)-connectivity in order to guarantee privacy against arbitrary subsets of t colluding agents.
There have been proposals [14, 20] for achieving differential privacy by having agents add independent local noise to intermediate values (also referred as states) computed during an execution of a distributed average consensus protocol. As the added noise is independent, it induces a loss in accuracy [5, 20] ; i.e., the agents are only able to compute an approximation of the true average (rather than the exact average), and there is an inherent tradeoff between privacy and the achievable accuracy.
To overcome the trade-off, [18, 19] proposed protocols where the local noise (or random values) added by an agent is subtracted over time (or iterations), allowing agents to converge to the exact average of the agents' inputs while preserving privacy of an honest agent's input if the honest agent has at least one honest neighbor that has no adversarial neighbor. In the privacy protocol proposed in this paper, agents add correlated random values to their inputs instead of adding local independent random values (refer Section 3). The correlation between the random values enforce their sum to zero. The proposed protocol preserves privacy (in the formal sense as stated in Definition 5 of Section 2) of the collective inputs of a group of honest agents if the group of honest agents is not cut (defined in Section 2) by the passive adversarial agents in the communication network (formally stated in Section 5). This implies that the proposed protocol preserves privacy of an honest agent's input if the honest agent has at least one honest neighbor in the communication network. Moreover, privacy results in [15, 18, 19, 20] do not hold if the agents' inputs are bounded integers, where the bounds are apriori known to all the agents.
Authors in [25] proposes of using appropriate edge weights in the underlying communication network topology to limit the observability of the distributed average consensus algorithm. However, the proposed scheme in [25] does not protect privacy of an honest agent if any one of its neighbors is adversarial or semi-honest. Whereas, our proposed privacy protocol can preserve privacy of all the honest agents if the semi-honest agents do cut them in the underlying communication network topology which means that every honest agent can have a semi-honest neighbor as long as the group of honest agents remain connected. The scheme of Gupta et al. [12] assumes a centralized, trusted authority that distributes information to all agents each time they wish to run the consensus algorithm.
While protocols based on homomorphic encryption [17, 27] can achieve strong privacy guarantees, they rely on Paillier cryptosystem which relies on the decisional composite residuosity assumption which implicitly assumes bounded computation power of passive adversarial agents [24] . In this paper, we focus on statistical privacy of honest agents' inputs regardless of the computation power of the passive adversarial agents.
We also note that some of the above solutions [14, 18, 19] require synchronous execution by the agents, whereas our proposed protocol is asynchronous (refer Section 3).
The proposed privacy protocol is particularly designed for the case when agents' inputs are bounded (apriori known) integers. This is often the case in practice as every machine (or electronic device) registers a value using only finite number of bits. Therefore, an agents' input can only be of finite precision and thus, can be mapped to an integer using proper scaling, without loss of generality 1 . However, the agents can compute the exact average of their inputs using our proposed protocol, that is the average of the inputs need not be an integer. Note: We assume that every agent has prior knowledge of the total number of agents in the network.
Summary of Our Contribution
We propose a general approach for achieving privacy in distributed average consensus protocols where the agents inputs are integers of known bound. Our approach involves two phases:
(1) In the first phase, each agent shares correlated random values to its neighbors and then computes a new, "effective input" based on its original input and the random values it shared with its neighbors. (2) In the second phase, the agents run an arbitrary distributed average consensus protocol (e.g., flooding or any other protocol from the literature [4, 16, 22 , 28]) using their effective inputs computed in the first phase rather than their original inputs.
We show that the above, two-step process correctly computes the average value of the agents' original inputs as long as the average consensus protocol used in the second phase is correct. This follows from the fact that the first phase is designed to ensure that the sum of the agents' effective inputs is equal to the sum of their original inputs under an appropriate modulo operation. We also show that privacy holds in our approach-in a formal sense and under certain conditions, as discussed belowregardless of the average consensus protocol used in the second phase. We prove this by showing that privacy holds even if all the effective inputs of the honest agents are revealed to the colluding semi-honest parties.
Our notion of privacy is adopted from the literature on information-theoretic secure multi-party computation [11] . Intuitively speaking, the privacy guarantee is that the entire view (defined formally later) of a group of colluding agents throughout the execution of our protocol can be simulated by those agents given (1) their original inputs and (2) the average of the original inputs 1 Any number σ of finite precision can represented as σ = x × 10 e where both the significand s and the exponent e are integers. The exponent e can be common for all the agents if the bound on the inputs is known to all the agents. of the honest agents (or, equivalently, the average of the original inputs of all the agents in the network). This holds regardless of the true inputs of the honest agents. As a consequence, this gives an intuition that that the colluding adversarial agents learn nothing more about the collective inputs of the honest agents from an execution of the protocol other than the averages of the honest agents' inputs, and this holds regardless of any prior knowledge the adversarial agents may have about the inputs of (some of) the honest agents, or the distribution of those inputs. We prove that our protocol satisfies this notion of privacy as long as the set of colluding semi-honest agents does not constitute a vertex cut of the network topology.
Our privacy-preserving protocol was previously described in the conference version of our paper [13] . However, the privacy definition we use here is stronger, and this version includes full proofs for our privacy claims.
Notation and Preliminaries
We let Z denote the set of integers, and let Z q denote the set of integers {0, . . . , q − 1}. For a finite set S, we let |S| denote its cardinality; for an integer q, we let |q| denote its absolute value. If x is an n-dimensional vector, then x i denotes its ith element and i x i simply denotes the sum of all its elements (unless the range of i is specifically mentioned). We use 1 n to denote the ndimensional vector all of whose elements is 1.
A simple undirected graph is represented as G = {V, E} where the nodes V {1, . . . , n} denote the agents, and there is an edge {i, j} ∈ E iff there is a direct communication channel between agents i and j. We let N i denote the set of neighbors of an agent i ∈ V, i.e., j ∈ N i if and only if {i, j} ∈ E. Note that i ∈ N i since G is a simple graph. We say two agents i, j are connected if there is a path from i to j; since we consider undirected graphs, this notion is symmetric. We let p i,j denote an arbitrary path between i and j, when one exists. A graph G is connected if every distinct pair of nodes is connected; note that a single-node graph is connected.
Definition 1 (Vertex cut) A set of nodes V cut ⊂ V is a vertex cut of a graph G = {V, E} if removing the nodes in V cut (and the edges incident to those nodes) renders the resulting graph unconnected. In this case, we say that
A graph is k-connected if the smallest vertex cut of the graph contains k nodes. Let G = {V, E} be a graph. The subgraph induced by V ⊂ V is the graph G = {V , E } where E ⊂ E is the set of edges entirely within V (i.e., E = {{i, j} ∈ E | i, j ∈ V }). We say a graph G = {V, E} has c connected components if its vertex set V can be partitioned into disjoint sets V 1 , . . . , V c such that (1) G has no edges between V i and V j for i = j and (2) for all i, the subgraph induced by V i is connected. Clearly, if G is connected then it has one connected component. For a graph G = {V, E}, we define its incidence matrix ∇ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} |V|×|E| (see [10] ) to be the matrix with |V| rows and |E| columns in which
1 if e = {i, j} and i < j −1 if e = {i, j} and i > j 0 otherwise.
Note that 1
T n · ∇ = 0. We use ∇ * ,e to denote the column of ∇ corresponding to the edge e ∈ E. We rely on the following result [10, Theorem 8.3.1]:
Lemma 1 Let G be an n-node graph with incidence matrix ∇. Then rank(∇) = n − c, where c is the number of connected components of G.
Problem Formulation
We consider a network of n agents where the communication network between agents is represented by an undirected, simple graph G = {V, E}; that is, agents i and j have a direct communication link between them iff {i, j} ∈ E. The communication channel between two nodes is assumed to be both private and authentic; equivalently, in our adversarial model we do not consider an adversary who can eavesdrop on communications between honest agents, or tamper with their communication.
Each agent i holds a (private) input s i ∈ Z q = {0, . . . , q− 1} for some publicly known, integer bound q > 1. The inputs could even be negative, and the range of inputs is restricted to non-negative values only for the sake of exposition 2 .
We let s = [s 1 , . . . , s n ] T . A distributed average consensus algorithm is an interactive protocol allowing the agents in the network to each compute the average of the agents' inputs, i.e., after execution of the protocol each agent outputs the values = 1 n · i s i . We are interested in distributed average consensus algorithms (or protocols) that ensure privacy of agents against some fraction of passive adversarial agents in the network.
We let C ⊂ V denote the set of adversarial agents, and let H = V \ C denote the remaining honest agents.
Definition 2 View of adversarial agents in C is an information set consisting of the inputs, internal states and received protocol messages of all the agents in C during an execution of the protocol.
Privacy requires that the entire view of the adversarial agents does not provide any information about the inputs of honest agents other than the sum of their inputs, which is unavoidable if the privacy protocol does not affect the accuracy of the average value of the inputs (which is the case here) and all the agents (including adversarial agents) learn the value of i s i = ns (assuming n is known apriori to all the agents). This privacy definition is formalized below.
Let s C denote a set of inputs held by the adversarial agents, and s H a set of inputs held by the honest agents. Fixing some protocol, we define View C (s) as follows:
Then,
Definition 4 A distributed average consensus protocol is (perfectly) C-private if for all s, s ∈ Z n q such that s C = s C and i∈H s i = i∈H s i , the distributions of View C (s) and View C (s ) are identical.
We remark that this definition makes sense even if |C| = n − 1, though in that case the definition is vacuous since s H = i∈H s i and so revealing the sum of the honest agents' inputs reveals the (single) honest agent's input.
Implication:
The above privacy definition equivalently states that for any distribution S (known to the colluding adversarial agents) over the honest agents' inputs, the distribution of the honest agents' inputs conditioned on the adversarial agents' view is identical to the distribution of the honest agents' inputs conditioned on their sum.
The assumptions made in this paper are- 
Private Distributed Average Consensus
As described previously, our protocol has a two-phase structure. In the first phase, each agent i computes an "effective input"s i based on its original input s i and random values it sends to its neighbors; this is done while ensuring that is i mod p is equal to i s i for some publicly known integer p (see below). In the second phase, the agents use any (correct) distributed average consensus protocol Π to compute the average of {ns i } or equivalently is i , reduce that result modulo p, and then divide by n. This clearly gives the correct average 1 n · i s i , and thus all that remains is to analyze privacy. Note that we do not require the final average of the inputs to be integer.
It may at first seem strange that we can prove privacy of our algorithm without knowing anything about the distributed average consensus protocol Π used in the second phase of our algorithm. We do this by making a "worst-case" assumption about Π, namely, that it simply reveals all the agents' inputs to all the agents! Such an algorithm is, of course, not at all private; for our purposes, however, this does not immediately violate privacy because Π is run on the agents' effective inputs {s i } rather than their true inputs {s i }.
If assumption (A4) holds, then the view of the adversarial agents consist of the initial inputs of the agents in C, their internal states and all the protocol messages they receive throughout execution of the first phase of our protocol, and the vectors = [s 1 , . . . ,s n ] T of all agents' effective inputs at the end of the first phase. The definition of privacy (cf. Definition 4) remains unchanged.
Before continuing with an analysis of privacy, we describe our first-phase algorithm. Henceforth, assumptions (A1) -(A3) holds by default.
Let p be an integer such that p > n · (q − 1) ≥ i s i . The first phase of our protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent, uniform values r ij ∈ Z p for all j ∈ N i , and sends r ij to agent j. (2) Each agent i ∈ V computes a mask a i ∈ Z p as,
(3) Each agent i ∈ V computes effective input
If assumption (A3) holds then
Moreover,
since G is undirected. Thus, is i = i s i mod p. Since i s i < p by choice of p, this implies that is i mod p is equal to i s i over the integers, and hence correctness of our overall algorithm (i.e., including the second phase) follows.
Note that any two neighboring agents i and j choose values r ij and r ji , respectively, independently. Agents i and j then transmit these values r ij and r ji , respectively to each other in an independent manner as well 5 . Therefore, Step 1 does not require synchronicity between any two agents. Steps 2 and 3 are performed locally, and therefore synchronicity between agents is out of question. Once an agent completes the first-phase, it floods the network with this information regardless of whether any other agent has completed the first-phase or not. As every agent has prior knowledge of the total number of agents, the agents reach an agreement on the completion of the first-phase when G is connected. Hence, the first-phase is asynchronous and this implies that the proposed protocol is asynchronous if the distributed average consensus protocol in the second-phase is asynchronous. In the second-phase, the agents can use an asynchronous distributed average consensus protocol, such as the randomized gossip algorithm [4] , to compute the average value of {ns i }, which equal to is i .
Privacy Analysis
We show here that C-privacy holds as long as C is not a vertex cut of G.
For an edge e = {i, j} in the graph with i < j, define b e = r ji − r ij mod p.
. .] be the collection of such values for all the edges in G. If we let a = [a 1 , . . . , a n ]
T denote the masks used by the agents, then we have
Since the r ij are uniform and independent in Z p , it is easy to see that the values {b e } e∈E are uniform and independent in Z p as well 6 . Thus, a is uniformly distributed over the vectors in the span (over Z p ) of the columns of ∇, which we denote by L(∇). The following is proved using the fact that rank(∇) = n − 1 when G is connected (cf. Lemma 1):
Lemma 2 Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), if G is connected then a is uniformly distributed over Z n p subject to the constraint that i a i = 0 mod p.
A full proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 3 Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), if G is connected then for a given value of s ∈ Z n q the effective inputs s are uniformly distributed in Z n p subject to the constraint that is i = i s i mod p.
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A.2.
The above implies privacy for the case when C = ∅, i.e., when there are no adversarial agents. In that case, the view of the adversary consists only of the effective inputss, and Lemma 3 shows that the distribution of those values depends only on the sum of the agents' true inputs. Below, we extend this line of argument to the case of nonempty C.
Fix some set C of adversarial agents, and recall that H = V \ C. Let E C denote the set of edges incident to C, and let E H = E \ E C be the edges incident only to honest agents. Note that now the adversarial agents' view contains (information that allows it to compute) {b e } e∈E C in addition to the honest agents' effective inputs {s i } i∈H .
The key observation enabling a proof of privacy is that the values {b e } e∈E H are uniform and independent in Z p even conditioned on the values of {b e } e∈E C . Thus, as long as C is not a vertex cut of G, an argument as earlier implies that the masks {a i } i∈H are uniformly distributed in Z |H| p subject to
given the values {b e } e∈E C . Hence the effective inputs {s i } i∈H are uniformly distributed in Z |H| p subject to
given the values of {b e } e∈E C and the sum of the honest agents' inputs 7 . This implies,
Theorem 4 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4)
, if C is not a vertex cut of G then our proposed distributed average consensus protocol is perfectly C-private.
Formal proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.3.
As a corollary, we have
-connected then for any C with |C| ≤ t our proposed distributed average consensus protocol is perfectly C-private.
Illustration
To demonstrate our proposed distributed average consensus protocol we consider a simple network of 3 agents with V = {1, 2, 3} and E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, as shown in Fig. 1 . Let the values of q and p be 10 and 30, respectively. Consider an instance where s 1 = 4, s 2 = 7 and s 3 = 3. First phase:
(1) As shown in After the first phase, each agent uses a (non-private) distributed average consensus protocol Π (as shown in Fig. 1 ) in the second phase to compute is i , which is equal to i s i = 14 under mod30. Let C = {3} and so, E C = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. It is easy to see that C does not cut the graph G and therefore, for any pair of inputs s 1 ∈ Z 10 and s 2 ∈ Z 10 that satisfy s 1 + s 2 = 11,s 1 ands 2 are uniformly distributed over Z 2 30 subject tos 1 +s 2 = 24 mod 30 (refer (3)).
7 Note thatsi = si +ai = si + e∈E C be ·∇i,e mod p, ∀i ∈ C. 
Extending Privacy
In this section, we present an extension of Theorem 4 for the case when C is a vertex cut, by relaxing our definition of C-privacy to (C, H)-privacy below. Here, the set H is a subset of V \ C, i.e. we are now interested in privacy of some of the honest agents instead of all honest agents.
(Apart from H, all other notations remain the same.)
Definition 5 A distributed average consensus protocol is (perfectly) (C, H)-private if for all s, s ∈ Z |H| q subject to s V\H = s V\H and i∈H s i = i∈H s i , the distributions of View C (s) and View C (s ) are identical.
Similarly, we remark that this definition makes sense even if |H| = 1, though in that case the definition is vacuous since s H = i∈H s i and so revealing the sum of the inputs of the honest agents H reveals the (single) honest agent's input! Essentially, if the view of the adversarial agents remains same for any two sets of inputs of the honest agents H that sum up to the same value then no information is leaked to the adversarial agents about the inputs of H other than their common sum. Note that C-privacy is equivalent (C, V \ C)-privacy. Therefore, if a distributed average consensus protocol is C-private then it is (C, H)-private for all H ⊆ V \ C. This is the reason why Definition 5 is a relaxation of Definition 4. As another corollary of Theorem 4, we have Corollary 2 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), if C does not cut H then our proposed distributed average consensus protocol (refer Section 3) is (C, H)-private.
As a consequence of Corollary 2, if an honest agent i has an honest agent j then the adversarial agents can not distinguish between two input values of s i , s i ∈ Z 2 q and s j , s j ∈ Z 2 q , respectively if s i + s j = s i + s j . An illustration of the above corollary is given below. Fig. 2 . In this case, the adversarial agents C = {3, 5, 10} cut the graph into 3 connected components with set of agents H1 = {1, 2}, H2 = {4} and H3 = {6, 7, 8, 9} (and edges incident to the respective honest agents). As mentioned before, our proposed distributed protocol preserves the privacy of each group of honest agents Hi, i = 1, 2, 3 in the sense of Definition 5. However, as |H2| = 1 the value of s4 gets revealed to the adversarial agents.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a private (asynchronous) distributed average consensus protocol that guarantees (perfect) privacy of honest agents' inputs against a set of passive adversarial or semi-honest agents if the set of adversarial agents is not a vertex cut of the underlying communication network. The only information that adversarial agents can get on the inputs of honest agents is their sum (or average). This reduces to having a network of (t + 1)-connectivity for guaranteed privacy of honest agents against if there are at most t number of passive adversarial agents in the network. In an obvious extension of this result, we conclude that our proposed distributed average consensus protocol can preserve the privacy of any subset of honest agents (in the network) as long as that subset of honest agents are not cut by the set of passive adversarial agents. A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is obvious for n = 1. Henceforth, n > 1. Choose a subset E of E with n − 1 edges such that G = {V, E } is connected (such a subset E is guaranteed to exist if G is connected). Therefore, all the n − 1 columns of ∇ correspondng to the edges in G are linearly independent (as incidence matrix of a connected graph has independent columns). As all the non-zero elements of ∇ are either equal to −1 or 1 and {b e } e∈E are uniformly distributed in Z
where ∇ is the incidence matrix of G with columns {∇ * ,e } e∈E . Note that 1 T n · a = 0 mod p as 1
(G is undirected, as per assumption (A1)).
From the method of induction we now prove that a is also uniformly distributed over all p n−1 points in L(∇ ). For any integer 0 ≤ k < |E| − |E |, let
where E (k) is the set of edges generated by adding any k edges from E \ E in E . Clearly, a 0 = a , which as shown above is uniformly distributed over all p n−1 points in L(∇ ). Now, we show that if a (k) is uniformly distributed over all p n−1 points in L(∇ ) for some k then the same 8 As non-zero elements of {∇ * ,e }e∈E are −1 or 1, thus e∈E ∇ * ,e · be mod p = 0 if and only if e∈E ∇ * ,e · be = e∈E ∇ * ,e · λep, where λe ∈ Z ∀ e ∈ E . Therefore, independence of {∇ * ,e } e∈E implies that e∈E ∇ * ,e · be mod p = 0 if and only if be = 0 ∀ e ∈ E . Hence, every value of {be} e∈E generates a unique value of a . is true for a (k+1) . Let e (k+1) be an edge in E \ E (k+1) and
As a (k) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over L(∇ ), we can substitute a (k) in equation above by e∈E ∇ * ,e · b e mod p, b e ∈ Z ∀ e ∈ E . This implies,
As G is connected, thus
where, µ e ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all e ∈ E . Therefore,
As {b e } e∈E is uniformly distributed over all points in Z n−1 p
and b e (k+1) is independent from all {b e } e∈E , therefore {b e + µ e b e (k+1) mod p} e∈E is uniformly distributed over all the points in Z n−1 p . Therefore, from above we can infer that a (k+1) is also uniformly distributed over all p n−1 points in L(∇ ). Induction of edges in this manner implies that a is uniformly distributed over all p n−1 points in L(∇ ) (a (k+1) = a when k = |E| − |E | − 1). Combining this inference with the fact that 1 T n ·a = 0 mod p as 1
(G is undirected) implies that a is uniformly distributed over Z n p subject to the constraint: i a i = 0 mod p.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Sinces i = s i + a i mod p, and s i , a i are independent random variables, we get P r (s|s) = P r (a = (s − s) mod p)
From Lemma 2 we know that P r(a) = 1/p n−1 , i a i = 0 mod p 0 , otherwise when G is connected. Therefore, P r(s|s) = 1/p n−1 , is i = i s i mod p 0 , otherwise 9 It follows from the fact that there exists a path in G between the terminal nodes of the edge e (k+1) as G is connected.
when G is connected. For a given value of s, there can be at most p n−1 values ofs that satisfy is i = i s i mod p. Thus, the above implies thats are uniformly distributed in Z n p subject to is i = i s i mod p when G is connected.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Let G H = {H, E H } be the graph of honest agents (and edges incident to only honest agents) and ∇ H be its incidence matrix. Note that G H is undirected as G is undirected. Due to assumption (A4), view of the adversarial agents in C consists of the inputs of the adversarial agents, effective inputs of all the agents (internal states are dependent only on the effective inputs of the agents in the second=phase of the protocol) and random values shared over edges incident to the adversarial agents in
Step (1) of the first-phase. Therefore, View C (s) = {s C , {s i }, {b e } e∈E C } .
Each a i can be decomposed as follows:
As the random values {b e } e∈E H are uniformly and independently distributed in Z p (given the values {b e } e∈E C ), this implies that the collection of random values { e∈E H ∇ i,e b e mod p} i∈H (vectors in L(∇ H )) is uniformly distributed over Z |H| p subject to the constraint i∈H e∈E H ∇ i,e b e = 0 mod p when G H is connected (cf. Lemma 2). Thus, if G H is connected then P r(a H |{b e } e∈E C ) = 1/p |H|−1 , i∈H a i = − i∈C a i mod p 0 , otherwise where, a i = e∈E C ∇ i,e · b e mod p, ∀i ∈ C and a H denotes the vector of honest agents masks {a i } i∈H .
Combining the above with the fact thats i = s i +a i mod p, ∀i, where s i and a i are independent for all i, implies that (s H is the vector of {s i } i∈H ) P r (s H |s H , {b e } e∈E C ) = 1/p As {b e } e∈E are independent to the inputs {s i }, thus P r (s H |s H , {b e } e∈E C ) = P r (s H , {b e } e∈E C |s H ) P r({b e } e∈E C )
As a i = e∈E C ∇ i,e b e mod p, ∀i ∈ C ands i = s i + a i mod p, ∀i, thus from (A.2) we get P r (View C (s)) ≡ P r (View C (s )) for all inputs s, s in Z n q that satisfy s C = s C and i∈V s i = i∈V s i mod p when G H is connected.
